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There  exists fairly  widespread  agreement  that,  especially over a long-run
time period, inflation  is aiways  and  everywhere  a monetary  phenomenon.
This proposition, however,  leaves  unanswered  the question  why  a central
bank  would  a11ow,  or possibly  persue,  an .inflationary  monetary  pol  icy.  To
answer  this  questjon,  a centrai bank  objective function is derived  which
recognizes  the existence  of both benefits and  costs assocjated  wjth 'inflation.  The  empirica'l  results indicate that vrhile  Federal  Reserve
behavior  is  random  in nature, benefits, in the form  of seigniorage,  and
costs, composed  of deviations  of unemployment  from  the pol  icymakerrs
preferred rate,  are significant factors in explaining  Federal  Reserve
behavior.
Kenneth  J.  Robi  nson
Research  Department
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Dallas
Stat  ion K
Da1  1as, Texas 75?221.  INTRODUCTION
In every  major  industrialized country  of the wor1d,  government
possesses  a virtual  monopoly  franch'i  se in the supply  of money. Such
control, as Hayek  (1976)  points out, has  resulted in a 'rhistory  of
inflation,  and  usually of inflations engineered  by government  and  for the
gain of governments.r'  This gain accrues  to government  through  severa.l
benefj  ts associ  ated  wi  th conti  nuous  i  ncreases  i  n the pri  ce 1eve1  .  Fi  rst
government,  jn jts  role as a supplier of money, collects seigniorage.
Second,  unanticipated  inflation  results in certain redistribution effects,
particularly  as regards  debtors  versus  creditors,  Sjnce  the federal
government  is a huge  debtor, it  stands  to gajn from such  a redistrjbutjon.
Third, unexpected  increases  jn the price 1eve1  allow government  to exploit
a shor"t-term  Phillips  curve  resulting in a reduction  in unemployment.
An  analysis  of inflation,  however,  must  also consider  the costs
involved  to the elected  government.  inflation,  whether  anticipated  or
unanticipated,  imposes  costs upon  the economy  for which  lhe elected
government  may  be held accountable. Antjcipated inflation  can  be thought
of as imposing  "menLr"  costs or direct costs associated  with changing
prices.  Further, unantjcipated  inflation  results jn an ex-post  capital
levy on the holders  of nomi  nal  1y-denomi  nated  instruments. Curiously,
pol  it'ical  costs associated  w'ith inflation  have  not received  much  attention.
Recognizing  the presence  of benefits and  costs assocjated  with
inflation,  the operative  question  becomes  does  the Federal  Resenve,  in its
conduct  of monetary  policy,  respond  to these  benefits and  costs and  if  so,
how? To answer  thjs  question,  we  develop  a model  of central bank  behavior
within which  the inflation  rate becomes  an endoqenous  variabie.  unl'i  ke-  t'
previous'ly-estimated  "reaction functionsr',  the model  includes  as arguments:
(1) seigniorage;  (2) revenue  from reducing  federal debt outstandjnS;  (3)
deviatjons  of unemployment  from  the pol  icymakerrs  preferred rate; and  (4)
consideration  of the costs of inflation.  We  then estimate  this model  over
the post-Accord  period (1951-1983),  using two-stage  least squares  under  a
random-coefficients  specification.  Such  a specification al  lows  us to test
for the stabl  jty  of Fed  policymaking. That js,  are the benefit and  cost
parameters  confronting  the po'l  icymaker  stable over time, or do they shift
and, if  so, when?  These  questions  ultimately confront  the I'independent"
nature  of the central bank.  If  pol  icy-making  is  unstable,  then the central
bank  behaves  rathen  erratically,  attempting  to achieve  either lower  or
higher rates of  inflation  at different  times in response  to the varyjng
costs and  benefjt,s  which  'it might  confront.  Such  behavior  casts doubt  upon
the hypothesis  of a rrtraditional'r  vjew  of montary  policy of an independent
central bank  conducting  policy free from  outs'ide  pressures. The  empirical
results indicate that Federal  Reserve  behavior  is  random  in nature.
Further, seignionage  and  unemployment  deviations  are significant  factors in
explaining  observed  inflation  rates.  The  revenue  variables are found  to
vary systematically  over lime, while unemployment  deviat'ions  are not
affected by election-year  considerations. We  proceed  as fol lows.  Sectjon
2 presents  a brjef  review  of the arguments  of the objective function.
Gjven  these  objectives, a model  of central-bank  behavior  is derjved in
section  3.  Section  4 presents  a description of the estimation  techniques
employed  and  examjnes  the empirical findings, following which  section  5
sets forth conclusions  and  suoqestions  for  future research.-J-
2. OBJECTIVES  OF  THE  POLICYMAKER
It  is assumed  that the Fed  values, or derives certain benefjts from,
both seigniorage  and  reducing  the value  of federal debt outstanding. These
revenue  sources  lessen the need  for" government  to  resort  to more
conventional,  overt methods  of taxation to finance  its  spending.  1  L  i,
also assumed  that the central bank  considers  more  I'traditionalrr  goa1s,  in
the form  of unemployment  and  the costs associated  with inflation.
2.1.  Reve  n  ue
Friedman  (1953)  points out that inflation  amounts  to an implicit  tax on
the holdings  of cash  balances. Classic  analyses  of inflationary finance
and  the associated  welfare costs have  a common  basjc structure [Bai  ley
(1956), Cagan  (1956)l  These  studies  make  use  of the Cagan  (1956)  money
demand  function in a situatjon in which  all  adjustments  to jnflation  are
assumed  to have  been  completed. Revenue,  in real terms, from  the inflation
tax is composed  of two parts: (1) the base  of the tax, whjch  js the level
of rea'l  cash  balances  demanded,  and  (2) the rate of the tax which  is the
rate of depreciation  in the real value  of money.
Inflation,  especial1y  when  unanticipated,  favors some  groups  over
others.  Inflation  reduces  the repayment  burden  of debtors  and  may
encourage  various types  of investments  (Kane  i982).  Since  government  js a
large debtor, it  stands  to gain from  this  redistribution  favoring  debtor"s
at the expense  of creditors.  As Barro  (1983)  and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a)
point out, this  redistribution effect  is analogous  to that associated  with
seigniot"age.  Unanticipated  inflation,  in effect,  reduces  the real
resources  embodied  in the governmentrs  commitment  to repay  its  principal
and  i  n  tere  st.-t-
2.2.  Performance  Variables
Ample  evidence  exists that the Federal  Reserve,  in jts  conduct  of
policy,  is guided  by macroeconomic  goai variables.  Federal  Reserve
"reaction functionsrr  are estimated  in an attempt  to capture  the effect on
monetary  pol  icy of departures  of certain macroeconomic  targets from  their
"desi  red" 1eve1s  (hlood,  1968)  .
Reaction  functions  estjmated  over the years  differ  in what  is assumed
to be the pol  icy variable (or dependent  variable).  These  functions  al  so
diffe|in  the definjtion  and  measure  of the actual targets from  their
desired level  s.  Regardless  of the po'l  icy instrument  considered,  these
studies find a str"ong,  consistent  response  by the monetary  authorities to
departures  of unemployment  from  the target rate.  Departures  of other goal
variables from  their  targets, such  as inflation,  balance-of-payments
surplus  and  real GNP  exhibited a less systematic  response  by the Fed  in the
models  estimated  (Barth, Sickles and  Wiest, 1982).
2.3.  Costs  of Inflation
As Banro  (1983)  points out, inflation  imposes  direct  costs upon  the
economy.  Economists  often have  trouble, however,  specifying  the exact
nature  of these  costs.  Fischer  and  Modigliani (1978)  provide  a descriptive
analysis  of the costs of anticjpated  and  unanticipated  inflation.
According  to Alt  and  Chrystal  (1983), unanticjpated  inflation  imposes
.  pol  itical  costs upon  incumbent  admin'i  strations as regar-ds  their  future
el  ectoral outcomes.
Inf  lat'ion  also inflicts  welfare  costs upon  the economy  as increases  in
the rate of inflation  result in reductions  in the amount  of l"eal  money-5-
balances  demanded.  Fischer  (1981)  provides  rough  estimates  of the welfare
costs of open  inflation  in the presence  of interest rate controls on
various  deposits.  In addition, estimates  of the welfare effects of
anticjpated inflation  arising from  its  impact  on capital are derjved
amounting  to as much  as 2-3 percent  of GNP. Fischer  concludes  that "lr/hile
the evjdence  and  numbers  cited...are  far from  defjnitive,  they support  the
notion that lhe weifare costs of high inflation,  even  if  the inflatjon  is
expected,  are large in the current United  States  economy"  (Fischer, 1981,
p. 36).
!.  a MoDEL  0F  CENTRAL  BANK  BEHAVIoR
3.1.  Definitions
Ille  assume  the Fed  considers  both the benefits it  derives and  the
costs incurred in conductjng  monetary  policy.  The  central bank  control  s
its  instruments  to achjeve  its  policy target (ostensibly, monetary  growth)
in an attempt  to obtain the goal of maximizing  jts  objective function.  The
obiective function contains  as arguments:  seigniorage,  redj  stribution
effects (here, those  associated  with reducing  the value  of government
debt), deviations of unemployment  from  a preferred  rate or goal and
consideration  of the direct costs associated  with inflation.
The  model  makes  use  of the following definitions:
Ma  = nominal  money  stock in period  t
G, = nomina'l  stock of net federal debt
Pt = the general  pri  ce I  evel
n, = 1oO(PrlP._r)
u, = loS(  MrlM._  r  )-6-
[l*1  = 
"*Pe.ted 
inflation  from  t  to t+1
Rr, = seigniorage  in perjod  t
Rn1  = revenue  from  depreciating  federal debt outstanding
yt = level of real income
where  u, is the Fedrs  target variable, Gt, ni*t  and  Va are exogenous,  II'
Pa  and  Ma  are endogenous  variables and  Rra  and  Rgt  are arguments  of the
Fedrs  objecti  ve functi  on.
3.2.  Reven  ue
3.  2.  i.  Sei  gni  oraqe
Seigniorage  in period t  is defined  as:
Rr. = (14.-M._  )/e, 
= Mt,/Pt-(Mt_l/Pt_1)(Pt_l/Pr) (1)
It  is assumed  that the demand  for real money  balances  depends  inversely on
expected  inflation,  as in Cagan  (1956),  and  positively on real income:
M.,zp.  = exp(av.-bnl*1).
Under  a fractional-reserve banking  system  the central
seigniorage  only a portion of the actual money  supply,
the (real)  monetary  base  and  the actual money  supply  is
of the real base.  Therefore:
Rr.=(  1/m.)  [exl1  av.-un!*,  )-exp(  av.-r-bnl-ilr)  J  .
If  the money  supply  multiplier  exceeds  unity, the Fed  shares  a portion ot
the revenue  with the banking  system. A reduction  in the multiplier  results




bank  recei  ves as
The  Fed  suppl  i  es
some  mul  Li  p1e,  mr,
(3)-7  -
3.2.2.  Redi  stri  buti  on  Effects
Redistribution  effects associated  with reducing  Lhe  value  of nominal
federal debt outstanding  generate  revenue  to government  in a manner
analogous  to seigniorage  and  are expnessed  as:
o  =rn  /D  -^  /D-l  (4) "gt  L-t-1'  't-1  "t-1"  t,
Holdings  of government  debt are assumed  to depend  upon  the difference
between  the nominal  interest paid on such  debt, i*,  and  expected  jnflation:
Gr/Pr=exp  Ig(  i  .-n;*1)  ] .
Then:
Rn.=exoIs(  i.-r-nf)l  -exoIs(  i  t-l-rr;)-ilt]  .
According  to Bach  and  Stephenson  (1974), households  have  consistently
been  large net creditors, while government  was  the main  offsetting debtor.
"Thus,  since  World  War  II  inflation  has  apparently  caused  a massive
transfer of wealth  fnom  households,  as the major  net creditor,  to the
federal government,  as the major  net debtor."3 (Bach  and  Stephenson,  7g74,
D. +l
The  Fed  may  be motivated  to provjde  seigniorage  and  to depreciate
federal debt due  to the gains  whjch  accrue  to government.  If  the Fed  is a
quasi  -i ndependent  agency,  i  t  may  deri  ve cerlai  n benefi  ts from  fol I  owi  ng
such  a policy.  These  benefiLs  are assumed  to rise monotonical  ly with these
two sources  of qovernment  revenue:
Bt=g  l  tRmt+B2tRgL  , (7)
(5)
(6)
where  Bra  and  B 2t nepresent  the Fedrs  "benefit parameters."-8-
3.2.3.  Costs
The  Federal  Reserve  is hypothesized  to be  concerned  with the
consequences  of its actions,  panticuiarly  as regards  unemploymenL  and  the
costs  associated  vrith  jnflation.  Given  the following  Phillips-curve
rel  ati  onshi  p:
ut=ul-'(nt-ni),
where  Ua  i  s the current
unempl  oyment,  i  nfl  ati  on
(8)
.  .,.n  .  .. unemployment  rate and  U; is the rrnatural"  rate o{
surprises  result  jn reductions  in the unemployment
.4 ra  te
As in Barro  and  Gordon  (i983b), it  is assumed  the natural rate
over time due  to autonomous  rea'l  shocks,  e.  Funther,  these  shocks
a persjst'i  ng influence  on the unemployment  rate:
Ul=lUl-1+(  1-I)Un+e.,
where  0<I<L  and  Un  is the long-run  mean  of Ul.  Therefore:
Ur=rUl_r+(  1-r;Un+e.-z(n.-n!)  .
The  Fed  is assumed  to view  deviations, in e'ither  direction,  of
unempioyment  from some  goal or desired level as generating  costs.
Unempioyment  rates below  that sought  by the Fed,  to the extent they nesult
in expectations  of accelerating  jnflatjon,  are considened  costly as it  then
becomes  more  difficult  to extract revenue  or exploit a Phillips curve  in
the future.  Increases  in the unemployment  rate above  the optimum  are also
assumed  to generate  costs due  to obvious  factors such  as forgone  output and
human  suffering.  In effect,  a simple  quadratic  I'loss function'r  is employed
which  implies that these  costs jncrease  at an increasing  rate tvith
departures  of unemployment  from  its  preferred 1evel.  That is,  the loss
function aDDears  as:





'  t  t' (  11)
\t.)
That unemployment  rate deemed  optimal by the poljcymaker  is assumed  to
be proportional  to the natural rate.  If  k is  less than unity,  the
policymaker  considers  the natural rate 'rtoo  high'r  relative to an efficiency
criteria.  This reflects distortions such  as unemployment  compensation,
income  taxation and  tnansfer  payments  which  may  result jn privately chosen
quantities of empioyment  being  too low (8arro and  Gordon,  1983b). If  k
equal  s unity,  then the policymaker  viel1s  the natural rate as optimal,
Therefore,  the costs which  the Fed  incurrs in its  conduct  of policy are
assumed  to j  ncl  ude  the fol  l  owi  ng:
c.=(  8,./2  )  (  u.-kul  )  2+(  $4rlz  )  (nt)2  ,
where  $r./2  and  6n,/2 are the Fedrs  "cost parameters."
JI,  +T,
The  last term in Equation  12  assumes  that departures  of inflation  from
zero also generate  costs as described  in Bailey (1956)  and  Fischer  and
Modigliani  (1978)  which  the Fed  considers  in its  policymaking.
3.?.4.  Federal  Reserve  Objective  Functjon
Combining  these  benefjts and  costs which  the Fed  confronts  in jts
conduct  of policy, we  denive  lhe following objectjve function for the
Federal  Reserve:
zt=[BltRmt*B21Rn1-(831/2)(Ut-kul)2-(84tlZ)(rrt)2].  (13)
The  Fed  chooses  jts  policy target, the monetary  growth  rate,  to achieve
its  ultimate goal of maximizing  the expected  value  of Equation  13.  Since
the Federal  Reserve  system  has  never  bound  jtself  to any  monetary  ru1e, we
proceed  under  the assumption  that the Fed  is a discnetionary  poljcymaker.
This analysis of discretionary pol  icy follows the general  line of argument-10-
presented  in Barro  (1983)  and  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983a  and  b).  Discretion
implies no possibiljties  for prior constra'ints  or commjtments  that would
l"estrict subsequent  choices  for money  growth  rates.  Di  scretionary  policy
is viewed  as a noncooperative  game  between  the policymaker  and  private
agents  in which  the former  must  take as given  the expectations  of the
latter.  l^lith  expectatjons  given, and  future values  of money  growth  rates
unrestricted, there are no effects in this model  of the choice  of current
money  growth  rates on future values  of the objectjve function.  Therefore,
the optimizing  policymaker  chooses  ut to maximize  the contemporaneous
expected  objecti  ve functjon.
The  assumption  that the policymaker  treats futul  e expectations  as given
fol.lows  from  the discretionary nature  of monetary  policy.  Under
discretjon, the central bank's  choice  of Ur'in no  way  constrajns  its  choice
of,t*1  .  That is,  ut supplies  no additional information  about  the
obiect'ives  or technology  of the poljcymaker. Expectatjons  of future
inflation  are a function of expectations  of future monetary  growth  rates.
In determining  expectations,  agents  consider  the policymaker's  optimization
problem  which  determines  the inflation  rate from  Equatjon  13.  The
determination  of expectations  thjs  period is divorced  from  the particular
realization of inflation.  That js,  at Lhe  start of period  t,  agents  form
expectations  by fonecasting  the pol  icymakerrs  best action contingent  on the
information  set.  In addition, nl*,  it  not conditioned  on the current
inflation  rate.  Therefore,  the pol  icymaker  faces  a problem  jn which
expectations  are exogenous  and, in forming  thejr  expectations,  agents
understand  the policymakeli  s in this  position (Barro, 1983,  Barro  and
Gordon,  1983a  and  b).-  11  -
In effect,  expectations  of inflation  are assumed  given to the Fed  only
if  the choice  of current money  growth  has  no implicatjons for expectatjons
of future money  growth  rates (and  thus no implicatjons for expectatjons  of
future inflation),  which  is the essence  of discretionary pol  jcymaking. In
particular,  this  concentration  only on the presenL  does  not derive from
myopia  on the part of the pol  icymaker. "Rather,  vrith given  expectations,
the policymaker  has  no  way  at date t  to influence (future values  of the
obj  ect  i  ve function)'r  (Barro, 1983).5'6
Therefore,  a discretjonary policymaker  chooses  the monetary  growth  rate,
ut,  to maximize  the curnent  expected  value  of Equation  13, given
expectations. Substituting for Rr, from  Equation  3, Rna  from  Equation  6
and  lJ. from  Equation  10, the first-order  condition is as follows:
Err(  1/m.)  [exn(av.-r-bn!-r.)i*Br.Iexn(  sIi  r_1-ni]-nt)l
+zF3t  [(  1-  k)  (  rul-  1+(  1-r  )un  )  -z(  rt-r: )  ]
-$4.llr=0.
Equation  14  states  that the inflation rate is chosen  such  that the
marginal  benefits  of an  extra  unit of inflation just equal  the  marginal
costs.T This  calculation  uses  three  conditions:  (  dfia/du,  )  |  n!,  n!*,  )=t t"om
Equation  2, (dn;+1/dur)=0,  and  E(e.)=0.
Solving  for the rate of inflation, we  assume  that:
E(  u+  -  kul  )=(  u.  -  kul  \ e  vl  t
which  implies that the Fedrs  forecast of the gap  between  unemployment  and
the target unemployment  nate equals  the actual gap.  Such  an assumption
implies perfect foresight on the part of the policymaker  as in De\rjald  and
Johnson  (1963), Fried'l  ander  (1973)  and  Havri  lesky (1967).8  This leads  to
the following rrreactjon  functionrr:
(  14)-12-
nr=(  0r./Bar)  [(  1/mr)  (r,1._r/p.)  ]*(  s2rlB4t)  (ct_r/pt) (16)
*z  [(  tsgt/B+t)  (  Ut-kut)]  .
Interpretjng Equatjon  16  as a reaction funct'ion  employs  the pivotal
assumption  that the Fed  is capable  of controlling the inflation  rate.
Further, the signs attached  to the coeffjcients of the reaction function
reflect  the rrutility  weightsrr  of Equation  13 and  the assumptjon  that,  jn
the central bank's  view, increases  in the inflation  rate increase  revenue
and  reduce  deviations  of unemployment  above  its  target.  If  unemployment  is
below  its  desired 1evel  , decreases  in the inflation  rate occur.
Equation  16 repnesents  that (equilibrium) rate of jnflation  which
results when  the policymaker  maximizes  the expected  value of his objective
function taking as given the formation  of expectatjons.  Further, Equation
16 represents  a rational-expectations  equilibrium in the sense  that the
inflation  rate is  sufficiently  high such  that the margina'l  benefits of a
hypothetical  unit of surprise inflatjon  just  balance  the marginal  costs
involved.  That .i  s, systematic  surprises  do not occulin  equiljbrjum.
Several  jmplications  follow from  Equation  16.  With  an'i  ncrease  in the
benefit parameters,  9''. and  Ba., confrontinq  the Fed,  the rate of inflation
lt  tt'
should  'increase. These  benefit parameters  might  be especially high during
wantime,  in periods  where  govennment  expenditures  have  risen rapidly olin
periods  when  alternate sources  of revenue  result in greater  welfare 
.losses
at the mangin  (Barro, 1983).  If  the actual costs of inflation  (as
preceived  by the Fed), F4r, increase,  then inflation  should  decrease. If
the gap  between  unemployment  and its  desired nate increases,  the extent of
the response  of inflation  depends  on the relative cost parameter  B?+/84+,-  IJ  -
The  rate of jnflation  should  increase  if  the costs of thjs  gap. B3t.
increase  more  than  does  the cost of actual inflatjon,  FOa.
Therefone,  estimating  Equation  16 under  a random-coeffjcients
specification al  lows  us to test for the presence  of movements  in these
parameters. If  the parameters  prove  time-varying,  taking account  of this
improves  the estimales  derived.  Further, any informat.ion  as to the tjmjng
or magnitude  of shifts  in these  parameters  confnonting  the Fed  provides
evidence  of the degree  of Federal  Reserve  independence.  For example,  do
the costs, as perceived  by the Fed,  resulting from  an excess  of
unemployment  over its  target increase  in an election year and  then decrease
aften an election?  0r, do these  costs remain  the same  regardless  of where
in the po1  itical  cycle the Fed  finds itself?
This interpretation of jnstabil ity  of the react.ion  functjon is consistent
with that of Froyen  (1974), Potts and  Luckett  (1978),  Abrams,  Froyen  and
V'iaud  (1980), Hamburger  and  Zwick  (1981)  and  Beck  (1982).  These  studies
attempt  to assess  the degree  of outsjde jnfluences  operating  on the Fed  by
examining  the stabjlity  of central-bank  behavior.
If  a rrtraditionalrr  model  of central-bank  behavior  guides  Federai  Reserve
pol  icymaking,  the Fed  is viewed  as an autonomous  inst.itution "inhabited  by
jnd.ividuals  who  are motivated  to manage  the economy  according  to their
perception  of what  is best" (Toma  1982,  p. 1981).  |rle  may  thus rr...treat
the Federal  Reserve  System  as a sovereign  decisionmaker  whose  managers  seek
singlemindedly  to promote  the public interest at every  turn" (Kane  1980,  p.
199).-14-
Therefore,  in the traditional  view  of monetary  po.l  jcymaking,  revenue
denived  from impl  icit  taxation such  as seigniorage  or depreciating  federal
debt is insignificant as an explanation  of observed  inflation  rates.
Further, such  a pol  icymaker  conducts  poiicy in a stable, consjsten!  manner.
That is,  the basjc goals  of pol  icy do not fluctuate.
Tests  of the hypothesis  that a tradjtional  model  holds  are conducted  by
deriv.ing  estimates  of Equation  16.  If  this  hypothesis  js correct, the
parameters  associated  wjth the revehue  terms  are statistically
insignificant.  That is,  policy is not conducted  with the goal of
extracting revenue  from  the private sector.  The  "cost" parameters,  B3a  and
F4, are assumed  sjgnjficant  in the traditional  model  of pol  icymaking. The
Fed  would  be concerned  with devjations  of unempioyment  from its  perferred
rate and  with the direct costs associated  with inflation.  However,  the
cost parameters  confronting  the Fed  are fixed under  the traditional  model.
A1  lowing  them  to vary ought  not to improve  upon  the estimates.  Therefore
if  the revenue  parameters  of Lhe  reaction function are statistically
significant,  and,/or  if  al  lowing  the parameters  to vary 'improves  the
estimates,  central bank  independence  is questioned. The  estimation
technique  and  empirical  results are in the next section.
4.  EMPIRICAL  RESULTS
4.1.  Two-Stage  Least  Squares
In an effort  to determine  whether  the hypothesized  benefits and  costs
are significant determinants  of Federal  Reserve  behavior,  we  derive
two-stage  least squares,  or instrumental  variables, estimates  of the
parameters  of the fol  l  owi  ng:- 15  -
ANNUAL=aO+a,  *S  EIGN+cr*  R  LDEBT+ar(  IJN  EMP-NATUN  )+e,  , (17  )
where  ANNUAL=Annual  rate of inflation per  quarter
5E161.1=1  1,/m,  )  *(  Mt_1/Pt  )
RLDEBT=(  G.-,,zPr)
UNEMp=z*Ut
NATIIN=z*k*lln '''''-'-  ''t




rt=random  di sturba  n  ce
Quarteriy  data are used  for the tjme period 1951-1983  9.  Estjmates  of
z, the Phillips  curve slope  parameter  are obtained  from  Barro  and  Rush
(1981).  Their study  examines  the effect of unanticipated  money  growth  on
the unemployment  rate for both annual  and  quarterly data.  It  is estimated
that a one  percentage-poi  nt increase  in unanticipated  money  growth  reduces
the unemployment  rate by a proportion  of 3.5 to 5.8 percent.  If  we  assume
that unanticipated  money  growth  results jn unantjcipated  inflation,  the
Barro  and  Rush  estimates  may  be employed  for the z parameLer  in Equation
1b.
Equation  17 is estimated  fon various values  of z and  k.  The  parameter
estimates  are not sensitive to variations in k or to values  of z lyithin the
Barro-Rush 
""ng..10 
Therefore,  we  report results for z=4.0  (which  also
accords  with Rushrs  (1986,  p. 271)  maximum-l  jkel  jhood  estimates)  and  k=1.0.
The  Breusch  (1978)  and  Godfrey  (1978)  test  statistic  indicates the presence-  lb  -
of serjal  correlation in the enror t."m.  11  Therefore,  the  Cochran-0rcutt
process  is  used  to obtain estjmates  of the first-order  autocorrelatjon
coefficient  along  with the Praj  s-Winsten  modification  to account  for the
first. observatjon. The  estimated  value of p, the autocorrelation
coeffi  ci  ent is 0.383. 12
In addition, as an indicator of the degree  of Fed  independence,  we
desire to determine  the extent to which  pof  icymaking  is  stable.  That js,
are the parameters  of Equation  17 subject  to structural changes  or random
variation?  If  so, the estimates  are inefficient  and  are improved  by
introducing  a randon-coefficjents  specjficatjon.  Therefore,  a test  for the
presence  of vaniation in the parameters  of Equation  17 is appropriate.  13
4.2.  Random-Coeffi  cj  ents Specification
Let us suppose  Equation  17 is  respecified  as follows:
ANNUAL=(cO+vOt)+(s1+vit)*SEIGN  (  18)
+(ar+vra)*RLDEBT+(  q3+v3t)*(  UNEMP-NATUN)'
where  the n,.  are regarded  as mean  response  coefficients and  crkt=clk+vkt  as
actual (random)  nesponse  coefficients for the ttn  observation. (It  could
be argued  that Equation  18 should  contain  another  additive disturbance,  the
ea of Equation  17, in addjtion to vot.  If  this  extra disturbance  js
included, its  variance  cannot  be estimated  separately  and  is thus jgnored
[Judge,  et.  al  .,  i980, p. 375]).  If  the parameters  of Equation  17 are
random  as specified jn Equat'ion  18, the model  has  a heteroscedastic
disturbance  term.  The  variance  at each  Doint is  the same  linear
combinatjon  of the squares  of lhe explanatory  variables at that point
(Hi  ldreth and  Houck,  1968).-17-
Gjven  the characterjstjcs of a model  containing  random  coefficients, it
is desirable to test  for the presence  of the type of heteroscedasticity
implied by Equation  18.  Breusch  and  Pagan  (1979)  provide such  a test.  The
test  statistic  developed  is a Lagrange-multipl  ier  procedure  for testjng the
nu11  hypothesis  of homoscedastic  disturbances  and  yields a x2 statistjc  of
75.41,  decisjvely rejecting thjs  null  hypothesis. Thus,  a
random-coefficients  specificatjon fits  the data better than does  a
homoscedastic  model. This model  of parameter  variatjon does  not require
the assumption  of abrupt structural changes  at known  points of time as in
Froyen  (1974)  and  Hamburger  and  Zwick  (1981).  Also, unijke the method
proposed  by Goldfeld  and  Quandt  (1976), aliowing the parameters  to enter as
random  variables obviates  the need  to identify  various "regimes"  and  a'l  lows
for the possibility  of a heteroscedastic  error term  at each  observation.
We  therefore use  Amemiyars  (1977, 1978)  modificatjon  of the Hildreth-Houck
(1968)  technique  to obtain consistent  parameter  estimates  of Equation  18  as
fol I  ows  :
ANNUAT=-17.2636*+31.029839**SEIGN  (  19)
(4.3673)  (4.4440)
-1  .  311065*RLDEBT+0.  107176**(UNEi4P-NATUN),
(0.6e58)  (0.0438)
t
R'=0.71,  B-G=0.3937,  *=si  gni  ficance at the one-percent  1eve1  .
Values  in parentheses  are standard  errors and  B-G  js the value  of the
Breusch  (1978)  and  Godfrey  (1978)  test  statjstjc  for autocornelation. The
results of Equation  19 indicate that a desjre to extract seigniorage  and
deviations  of unempioyment  from  the Fed's  preferred level are significant
factors in explaining  observed  rates of inflatjon.  RLDEBT  possesses  the-18-
wrong  sign, but is not significant at the fjve-percent  level  .  These
parameter  estimates  cast doubt  upon  the hypothesis  of a traditional  model
of central bank  behavior.  Seigniorage  is not a signifjcant variable in
such  a model  .  A1  so, the jnstability  of pof  icymaking  as evidenced  by the
Breusch-Pagan  (1979)  test further undermines  the hypothesjs  of central bank
autonomy.
4.3.  Model  With Time  Trend
Barro  (1982,  p.332)  points out that the amount  of revenue  the Fed  coilects
from inflat.ionary  finance has  roughly  doubled  over the past twenty  years,
indicating the desire to extract revenue  may  vary w'ith  time.  That is,
ANNUAL  may  respond  differently  to pen  unit changes  in the independent
variables of Equatjon  17  over different  time periods.  If  so, a model  which
allows  the coefficients to capture  this possibi'l  jty  results in more
efficient  parameter  estimates.  Singh  et.  al  . (1976)  consider  such  a
specjfication in which  the regression  coeffjcjent,  cOa,  is  subject  to t'.to
jnfluences  which  cause  it  to devjate from  its  mean  va1ue,  ctO. The  first  of
these  is a random  disturbance  as in Hildreth and  Houck  (1968).  The  second
influence  reflects the presence  of factors that may  vary with time.  The
essence  of this  specification is  that jt  assumes  no knowledge  of where
parameter  shifts  occur  but attempts  to investigate  whether  and  when  such
shifts  take p1ace. Unlike the procedure  employed  by Beck  (1982), the
technique  developed  by Singh  et.  al.  (1976,  p. 342)  penmits  appropriate
tests of significance  of the estimated  panameters.  The  model  estimated  is
that of Equation  17  with the following specification for the coefficients:
skt=ak+6kf  k(  t )+vkt, (  20)-19-
where  f,,(t)  js  some  function of time.  Calendar  time is used  as a sut"rogate
K-  '
for those  causes  that affect c|(, systematically,  while the error term, ukt,
is the random  component.  The  specification of the trend term is guided  by
the sample  information  according  to Singh,  et.  al.  (1976,  p. 344).  These
authors  recommend  estimating  the model  with alternatjve forms  of fO(t)  such
,
as f(t)=t,  f(t;=1',  f(t)=1n14;, etc. and  choosing  the specification which
explains  the maximum  varjatjon in the dependent  variable.  Therefore,  we
report results for f,,(t)=fr(t)=t.  For f"(t)  we  approximate  a parabol'ic
l  t''  J'  '
tnend  whjch  assumes  increasing  response  beginning  two  years befone  a
presjdential election year fol  lowed  by decreasing  response  jn the
subsequent  two  years.  This concentratjon  on presidential electjons
facil jtates comparisons  with Froyen  (1974), Potts and  Luckett  (1978)  and
Beck  (1982).  Substituting Equation  20 into Equation  17  amounts  to a model
containing  jnteraction terms  plus a heteroscedastic  error term.  This
specification atLempts  to capture  an increasing  trend associated  \rith
revenue  over tjme plus a concern  regarding  unemployment  which  is  jnfluenced
by the electoral cyc1e. Under  this  specification Singh  et.  a1. (1976)
provide  a four-step procedure  for obtaining  consistent  parameter  estimates.
The  results are as follows:
ANNUAL=-9.7281*-12.2629*SEIGN+6.3509**RLDEBT  (21)
(3.378)  (s.?20)  (2.04s)
-0.  0602*(  UNEFIP-NATUN)+0.  3S25**f  ,'  1  t;*SEIGN
I
(0.044)  (0.084)




The  response  coefficjent for SEIGN  is now  insignificant.  A
statistical ly  significant estimate  for 01, however,  'indicates  the variable
SEIGN  exhibjts increasing  shifts with time.  The  mean  response  coefficient
for RLDEBT  is now  significant and  correctly signed,  whjle the estimate  for
02 shows  a decreasing  tendency  in response  over time.  Thus,  the data
indicate that the revenue  varjables have  tended  to move  in opposite
directions over time.  Deviations  in unemp'loyment  are now  no longer
significant and  also do not appear  to elicit  a response  on the part of the
Fed  dependent  upon  presidential election years.
5.  CONCLUSION  AND  FUTURE  RESEARCH
5.1.  S  umma  ry
Estimates  of a Federal  Reserve  reaction function are derived using
two-stage  least squares. Revenue  attainable through  money  creation and
deviations of unemployment  from  the Fed's  target are significant variables
in explaining  observed  inflation  rates.  A significant revenue  term  casts
doubts  regarding  the extent to which  Fed  policy 'i  s appropriately  vielred  in
'rtraditional 
" terms.  A further indjcator of the degree  of central bank
independence  is the extent to which  policy is  stable.  Tests for stabil  ity
are conducted  which  obvjate the need  to identify  various  "regimes."  In
addition, non-constant  error variances  are al  lowed  at each  observation.
Federal  Reserve  pol  icymaking  is  found  to be random  in nature  supporting  the
conclusion  that r'...the Federal  Reserve  has  not responded  in a balanced,
systematic  way.  .  .that instead  it  has  responded  erratical  ly,  attempting  to
achieve  one  goal then another, some  say in response  to an increased
sensitivjly  to pol  itical  pressures"  (Abrams,  Froyen  and  lrlaud,  1980,  pp.-  L!  -
30-31).  Final  1y, \4e  present  a specificat.ion  which  allows the effect of the
explanatory  variables on the dependent  variable to vary with tjme.  t,Je  find
an increasing  trend associated  with the response  of seigniorage,  a trend
which  decreases  over time for RLDEBT  and  deviat.ions  of unemployment  from
target not affected by political  considerations.
5.2.  Suggestions  for  Future  Research
The  model  of central bank  behavior  considered  does  not allow the Fed  to
'invest  in its  reputatjon  or credibi  I  ity  in that the Fed  is assumed  to view
expectations  as exogenous.  Reputationa'l  models  allow for a link  between
expectatjons  format,jon  and  current policy.  Th.i  s link  is the central bank's
neputation.  In our model,  reputatjon  or credibility  concerns  are
incorporated  by relaxing the assumption  of djscretionary pol  icymakjng. The
poiicymaker  then realizes that the choice  for the current target constrains
his choice  next period.  As such,  expectations  are affected by cunrent
policy actions and  are no longer  considered  exogenous.  Concern  over
reputation  or credjbi.l  ity  may  substitute for formal  commitments  or the use
of stationary rules on the part of the policymaker.
It  is also of interest to examine  the stabil  jty  of Fed  pol  jcymaking  as a
function of shifting coalitjons within the Fed  itself.  That  is,  to what
degree  is observed  instability  of central bank  pol  icymaking  the result of a
new  chairman  of the Board  of Governors?  Are periods  of different  chairmen
meaningful  sub-periods  by which  to classify monetary  pol  icy?  Methods
suggested  by Goldfeld  and  Quandt  (1976)  are usefui in investigating these
questjons.-2?-
Fina11y,  the extent to which  the model  developed  jn this  anaiysis  is
applicable  to other countries  can  be investigated.  It  is not only the
Federal  Reserve  System  which  js assumed  to be autonomous.  As such,  we
might examine  the role revenue  considerations  and  unemployment  play in
observed  inf  lat.ion  rates in other countries.  An  analysis  of a
cross-section  of countries  over time may  be attempted. Such  fixed and/or
random  effects model  s as in lladdala  (197i) would  be appr"opriate  for the use
of such  rrpanel  data.r'  Swamy  (1970)  provides  a model  by which  to combine
cross-section  and  tjme-series  data in a random-coefficjents  specification.-23-
ENDNOTES
For  an  explanation  of why  the Federal  Reserve  might  benefit  by responding
to certain  (impl  icit)  incentives  proferred  by partjcular  branches  of
government,  see  Kane  (1980,  1982),  Macesich  (1984)  and  lrloolley  (1984,
1e8s).
Toma  (1982)  descripes  several  alterations in the rrmonetary  constitutionrl
which  effectively decreased  the value  of the multiplier.  Barro  (1982)
provides  empiricai  evidence  of the importance  of seigniorage. in
actua'l  'ity, the U.S. Treasury  does  not simply  regard  newly-created
monetary  base  as current revenue. However,  when  lhe Fed  perrnanently
increases  the base,  it  usually lends  money  indirectly to the Treasury  by
increasing  its  holdjngs  of U.S. government  securjtjes.  While  the
Treasury  pays  the Fed  interest,  the Fed  transfers its  profits  (composed
mostly  of these  interest payments)  back  to the Treasury.  rrOver  the entjre
period from 1914-1983,  System  payments  to the Treasury  have
totaled,..almost 90 percent  of the System's  gross  incomerr  (Johnston,  V.,
1984).  Therefore,  the Treasuny  in effect receives  an interest-free loan
equal  to the increase  in base  money.
Bach  and  Stephenson  (1974),  Moore  (1979)  and  Mumper  and  Usianer  (1982)
describe  other redi  stribution effects associated  with inflation.  See
Fi  scher  and  Modigliani  (1978,  p. 827)  for an explanation  of the
difficulties  involved  in considering  these  other redistribut'ion  effects
when  examjning  central bank  behavior.
'  Equation  8 implies that only unanticipated  monetary  expansions,  as
reflected in positive values  for  (II--n:) lead to increases  in real
economic  activity.  Equivalently,  these  nomjnal  shocks  lower  the
unemployment  rate below  its  natural rate.  This hypothesis  is consistent
with rational expectations  model  s used  in Lucas  (1973)  and  Barro  (1976)
This assumption  of discretion on the part of the pol  icymaker  ignores  the
possibility  that the central bank  invests in its  reputation  or
credibility.  In reputational  model  s of central bank  behavior,  jt  is
assumed  that current actjons of the policymaker  infiuence expectations
regarding  future actions.  The  link  between  current acLions  and
expectations  is the Fed's  reputation (Barro  and  Gordon,  1983a). For a
summary  of the research  to date on credjbiljty,  see  Cukierman  (1986).
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1977)  argue  that the process  of se'lecting  Lhe
pol  icy variable which  is best, g'iven  current conditions,  will  1ike1y
converge  to a time-consistent  but suboptimal  policy.  A time-consistent
policy is one  in whjch, for each  period, the policymaker  maximizes  an
agreed-upon  objective function taking as given  previous  dec'i  sions of
economic  agents  and  jn which  future poiicy decjsions  are similarly
selected,  Thus,  a rules-type equi  librium may  be optjmal  but
time-inconsistent  as the policymaker  has  an incentive to deviate from  the
rule when  agents  expect  it  to be fo11owed,  leading  to low cred'ibil  ity.l0
11
-24-
Discretionary  pol  icymaking  is suboptimal  , but meets  the requjrements  of
dynamic  consjstency. As Barro  and  Gordon  (1983b)  point out 'rThis
terminology  is deceptive  in that it  suggests  that these  decision rules
represent  alternative solulions to the same  problem. Though  the
objectiye function and  decision  rules of private agents  are identical,
the problems  differ  in the opportunity  sets of the pol  icymaker.rl
The  second-order  condition satisfies  the requinements  for"  a maximum  as:
,2
d'Zr/dvr'=-g  rr(  1/m.  )  [e  x  o(  ayt_i  -bn;-[t )  ]
-0r.Iexn(  s  Ii.-1-n;]-nt)  l
2 -r-E3t-F4t'0.
Abrams,  Froyen  and  V'/aud  (1980,  p. 33) argue  this  assumption  introduces
two sources  of bjas.  First,  simuitaneous-equation  bias is present  if  t,he
dependent  variable of the reaction functjon affects the explanatory
variables  within the period.  Second,  an errons-in-variables  problem  is
present  since the pol  icymakers  forecast differs  from  the actual variab'le.
Therefore,  inconsistent  parameter  estimates  are obtained. We  jntroduce
instrumental  variables  to resolve  the fjrst  probiem. Abrams,  Froyen  and
|l/aud  (1980,  p.34)  suggest  an instrumental  variable procedure  to overcome
the errors in variables.  Judging  the relative merits of the instruments
in this  case,  however,  is impossible  as these  authors  point out. ',How
efficjent  these  (instruments)  will  be depends  on how  high the conrelation
r's  between  the actual forecasts  and  our measures  of these  forecasts...The
unobservabiI  ity  of the true pol  icymaking  forecasts  makes  the measurement
of these  correlat'ions  impossiblerr  (Abrams,  Froyen  and  Waud,  1980,  p.
34)(emphasi  s added)  .
See  Appendix  A for a description of the instruments  generated  and  data
used.
See  Appendix  B for estimates  of Equaiton  17  under  varjous  vajues  of z
and  k.
This discussion  assumes  the absence  of vector autocorrelation  of the
type described  in Gu'i  lkey (1974).  That is,  we  assume  the error terms  of
Equations  A1-A3  are senial  ly  uncorrelated  and  uncorrelated  with each
other.
A possible  explanation  for the nonindependence  of the error term js
omitted  variables.  The  exclusion  of relevant  variables imparts
autocorrelation  to the disturbance  term .if the excluded  variabies are
themselves  autocorrelated.  Funther,  the exclusion  of relevant variables
could give rise to observed  instabi  lity  of the parameters  of Equation
77.  Ramsey's  (1969)  RESET  procedure  is  useful for detecting this
problem  since, as Thursby  (1981)  points out, RESET  is  robust to
autocorrelation.  Thursby  and  Schmidt  (1977)  find that the "test
variables" which  yield  the most  powerful  results are composed  of powers
of the regressors, Uti  l  izi ng RESET  i  n thi s manner,  an F-stati  stic  of
2.98  with (6,118)  degrees  of freedom  implies that we  accept  the nu11
hypothesis,  at the five-percent level  ,that no specificat.ion  error"  js
present  due  to omitted  variables.
I21? '"  It  should  be pointed  out that  instability  in Fed  policy response  does
not necessarjly  jndicate policy formation  js subject  to political
influences.  Such  observed  unsteadiness  might  r"ef  lect instability  in the
rrfirst  stagerr  regnessions  which  characterize  the instruments  (Abrams,
Froyen  and  Vrlaud,  1980, p.  31)-  to-
APPENDIX  A
The  technique  of instrumental  variables, or two-stage  least squares,
nesolves  the sjmultanejty  present  in Equation  17.  The  problem  is that
jnflation  influences  as  well as is  influenced  by SEIGN,  RLDEBT  and
deviatjons of unemployment  from  that rate deemed  acceptable  by the Fed.
For SEIGN  and  RLDEBT  the reverse  causation  flows through  the current price
level,  Pr.  A change  in Pa  changes  ANNUAL  and  wi11, by definition,  change
SEIGN  and  RLDEBT.  The  simultaneity  associated  with unemp'loyment  operates
through  a usual  Phillips curve  mechanism  as.in Equation  8.  As jnstruments,
r{e  pnopose  the fol lowing:
S  EIGN=  sO+x?-  1  s  r., 
* R  I r- r- rl=, s2  i 
*TBI  LLt_  j
+xl=rs,,*SEIeu.-,
R2=0  . 9040
RLDEBT=d0+xi=rar,  *eov._,  +r]=2e2i  *pIr_- (A-2)
+rf=2or,"RLDEar.-.,  R2=0.9624
(  UNEI4P-NATUN  )=uo+r]-,  ur, *  I NDrR0.-.,  +rf-, uZ  -  *RESALt- 
i
n +E  j=rur.'  *(  UNEMP-NATUN  )t_. R2=0  . 9562  ,
where  PI=Personal  I  ncome
TBI  LL=Three-mo  n  t h Treasury  Bi'l  I  rate
GOV=Government  Expe  nd  i  ture  s
INDPR0=I  ndex  of Industrial  Production
RESAL=Reta  i  I  sal  es
(A-  1)
(A-3)-27-
Equations  A1-A3  are used  to generate  predjcted  values  of the
independent  varjables of Equation  17  As such,  these  equat.ions  may  be
thought  of as rrfirst-stagerr  regressions. Then,  in the ',second  stage,rl
these  predicted  values  are used  as instruments.  As lagged  variables are
used  to generate  predicted  values, the instruments  are not affected by (are
exogenous  with respect  to) the current rate of inflation.  This conditjon
ho]ds, however,  only if  the error term  of Equation  17 is  serjally
i  ndependent.
The  first-stage  regressions  attempt  to capture  those  variables  which
explain SEIGN,  RLDEBT  and  (UNEMP-NATUN),  and  are also exogenous  with
respect  to the current inflation  rate.  That is,  as SEIGN  is a function of
the amount  of the medjum  of exchange  demanded,  lags of personal  income
appear  to represent  a "scale variable'r  common  jn money  demand  functions,
Lags  of interest rates are jncluded  to capture  the opportunity  cost of
money  holdings.  Fina11y,  lags of the regressor  itself  are used.  Simjlar
consideratjons  were  employed  in the constructjon  of the other instruments.
Using  these  insLruments,  we  then concentrate  on obta.ining  estimates  of the
parameters  of Equation  17  This focus  on a single equation  is consistent
with reaction functions as estimated  by \{ood  (1963), Froyen  (1974)  and
Abrams,  Fnoyen  and  Waud  (1980)  who  aiso make  use  of instrumenta'l  variables.
Descri  pti  on of Data  Set
Quarterly  data  wene  collected for the explanatory  var.iables  of Equation
17 and  the instruments  in Equations  A1-A3. The  time period  chosen  for the
analysis is the post-Accor"d  period (1951-1983),  to assume  a maximum  amounl
of independence  of the Federal  Reserve  System, The  criteria  we  use  for
"independenceI  js described  by hlooiley  (1985,  p. 320):-28-
At a minimal  1evel  , a central bank  can  be considered  to be independent
if  jt  can  set policy instruments  without approvai  from  outside
authorjties, and  jf,  for  some  min.imal  period  of tjme, the jnstrument
settings clearly differ  from  those  preferred  by the fiscal  authority.
Data  between  the post-War  period and  i951 exhibjt the effects of the
Fed's  rrpeggingrr  operations  as directed by the U.S. Treasury.  From  1914
until  the mid-1930's,  the Comptroller  of the Currency  and  Secretary  of Lhe
Treasury  were  members  of the Board  of Governors,  rendering  this time period
questional  jn meeting  the criterja  of independence.  Finally, we  excl  ude
the remaining  years  due  to the djstortions caused  by the depressjon  and
second  worl  d wa  r.
Ma  is defined  as the narrow  money  stock, or Ml  .  This constitutes
currency  plus demand  deposits  plus other checkable  depos.its  (available
after  1980).  The  data for the series are unadjusted  for  seasonal  variation
as it  is this anount  from  which  the Fed's  revenue  accrues.  pa is defined  as
the Implicit  Price Deflator, G.N.P.  total,  1972=100.
Data  on Ua  are defined  as the total  unemployment  rate - allciviljan
worKers  as percent  of the civilian  labor force, adjusted  for  seasonal
variation.  Ma,  Pa  and  Ua  are found  in Eusiness  Statistics:  The  Biennial
Supplement  to the Survey  of Current  Business,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,
U.S. Department  of Commerce,  1979  and  1982  editions and  also.i  n vanious
issues  of the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.
The  money  supply  multiplier,  mt, is derjved  by dividjng the money
supply  by the monetary  base.  The  monetary  base  is defined  as totai
reserves  pius currency  outside the U.S. Treasury,  Fedenal  Reserve  Banks  and
valuts of nonmember  banks,  not seasonally  adjusted.  Data  for the base  are
found  in Annual  Statistjcal  Digest, Board  of Governors  of the Federal-29-
Reserve  System,  1,97  0-1979  and  1982  edjtions, plus various  editions of the
Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.  Ga  is defined  as total  gross  pub'l  ic debt of the
U.S. government  held by the public, excluding  that held by U.S. government
agencies  and  trust  funds  and  that held by Fedenal  Reserve  banks. These
data are avai'lable  in various  issues  of the Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.
Estimates  of the natural rate of unemployment  were  obtajned  from  Gordon
(1984,  Appendix  b).  Pi is defined  as personal  income,  seasonal  ly adjusted
tota'l  s at annual  rates.  Data  on GoV  are defined  as federal government
outlays  while those  on TBILL  represent  the yield on U.5. government
securities (taxable) three-month  bills  (rate on new  issues-open  market
rates in New  York  city.  INDPR0  represents  the index  of industrial
production  (1967=100)  adjusted  for  seasonal  varjation and  RESAL  is defjneo
as (estimated)  retai1 sales adjusted  for  seasonal  variation and  trading-day
differences, al1 types  of retai  I  stores.  Data  for these  varjables ane
found  jn Business  Statistics:  The  Biennial Supplement  to the Survey  of
Current  Bus  i  ness.
Data  for personal  tax and  nontax  payments,  the federal government
deficit  and  for gross  national product  are found  jn Busjness  Statjstics:
1982,  23rd  edition A Supplement  to the Survey  of Current  Business,  November
1983  and  various  issues  of the Survev  of Current  Business.-  JU  -
APPENDIX  B
Estimates  of Equation  17  Under  Various  Values  of z and  k
z=3,  k=0.6
x*lt
ANNUAL=-2o.143124  +33.41066  *SEIGN-1.39291  *RLDEBT
(3.3189) (3.365e) (0.4e01)
J<)




ANNUAL=-19.7699+34.0107  *SEIGN-1.3949  *RLDEBT
(3.3s3s)(3.3811) (0.4es5)




ANNUAL=-19.648804  +34.219097  *SEIGN-I.394601  *RLDEBT
(3.3664)  (3.3877) (0.4e74)
+0.  17166  *(  UNEtvlP-NATUN),




ANNUAL=-Z0.  143124  +33.410663  *SEIGN-1.392910  *RLDEBT
(3.318e) (3.36se) (  0  .  4e01)
J<.




ANNUAL=-19.769937  +g+.OtZO66  *SEIGN-1.394927  *RLDEBT






+O  . 147406**(  UNEMP-NATUN)  ,
(0.0361)
^2  ^ -"-^
x =u  .  5lb6-  Jl  -
z=3.5,  k=i
ANNUAL=-19.648804*+34.2190g7**SEIGN-1.394601**RLDEBT  (8-6)
(3.3664)  (3.3877)  (0.4e74)
l<t
+0.147143  *(UNEMP-NATUN),  R'=0.5149
(0.0366)
z=4,  k=0.6
ANNUAL=-20.  143124*+33.410663**SEIGN-1.  392910  *RLDEBT
(3.3189)  (3.36se)  (0.4e01)
(B-7)




ANNUAL=-19.  769937*+34.  017066**SEIGN-1.  394927**RLDEBT
(3.353s)  (3.3811)  (0.4e55)
(  B-8)
+0.  128980  *(  UNEMP-NATUN),
(0.0316)
R2=0  .  5168
z=4.5,  k=0.6
ANNUAL=-20.143124*+33.410663**SEIGN-1.392910**RLDEBT  (B-9)
(3.3189)  (3.365e)  (0.4e08)
x,
+0.!14787  *(UNEMP-NATUN),  R'=0.5222
(  0  .  026e)
z=4.5,  k=0.9
ANNUAL=-19.  769937*+34.  017066**sEIGN-1.  394927**RLDEBT
(3.3s35)  (3.8114)  (0.4e5s)
(B-10)





ANNUAL=-19.648804  +34.219097  *SEIGN-I.394061  *RLDEBT  (B-11)
(3.3664)  (3.3877)  (0.4e74)
x,




ANNUAL=-2O.143124  +33.410663  *SEIGN-1.392910  *RLDEBT
(3.318s)  (3.3659)  (0.4e01)
Jrt
+0.103309  *(UNEMP-NATUN),  R'=0.52?2.
(0.0242)
z=5,  k=0.  9
**)k
ANNUAL=-19.769937  +34.017066  *SEIGN-1.394927  -RLDEBT
(3.3s35) (3.3811)  (0.4ess)
(B-12)
+0.  103184  *(UNEi'4P-NATUN),
(0.02s2)
R2=0  .  5168
z=5,  k=1
ANNUAL=-19.648804*+34.219097**SEIGN-1.394601**RLDEBT  (B-14)
(3.3654)  (3.3877)  (0.4974)
*t
+0.10300  *(UNEMP-NATUN),  R'=0.5149
(0.02s6)-  JJ  -
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